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Cognition and Sensation: A Reconstruction 




n this paper, I will attempt a reconstruction of Herder’si cen-
tral thesis in the philosophy of mind, which we might term 
‘quasi-empiricism,’ drawing on his On the Cognition and 
Sensation of the Human Soul (1778) and On Images, Poetry, and 
Fable (1787). Because of the ‘roughed up’ style of Herder’s philo-
sophical prose, I take this to be a non-trivial task, requiring both 
heavy interpretive work and philosophical assessment in order 
to render it into a clear, coherent doctrine. I will decompose the 
thesis  into  its  two parts:  first,  its  empiricist  aspect,  which 
amounts to the claim that our (physically grounded) sensations 
determine  our  cognitions;  second,  its  ‘quasi’  aspect,  which 
amounts to the claim that our sensations depend on, in some 
sense, our conceptual framework, instantiated by our cognitions. 
I will show that Herder’s commitment to an empiricist picture is 
bound up with his commitment to a naturalistic concept of the 
mind, and that the complication of the ‘quasi’ arm of the thesis, 
that sensations depend on concepts, must be construed in light of 
these naturalistic commitments. Along the way, I will resist ob-
jections from a ‘pure empiricist’ standpoint that attempt to un-
dermine Herder’s motivation for positing the influence of con-
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cepts on sensations, as well as an interpretation (Beiser’s) that 
unnecessarily weakens Herder’s thesis by improperly construing 
its naturalistic commitment.ii  
 
I. The Empiricist Arm 
 Herder’s commitment to an empiricist picture is clearly artic-
ulated in both On the Cognitions and On Images: “[the soul] only 
cognizes what this place shows it…. It must use the irritations, 
the senses, the forces and opportunities which became its own 
through a fortunate, unearned inheritance”iii; “Human cognition 
starts from the senses and from experience, and everything 
comes back to them.”iv For Herder, all cognition is dependent 
upon sensation, so that reason would be unable to operate with-
out the experiential materials provided to it by the senses.  
 We can also see that Herder is committed to a stronger claim, 
that cognitions are not only dependent on their corresponding 
sensations, but moreover constitutedv by them, in light of his nat-
uralistic picture of the mind. Structurally, On the Cognitions 
builds the mind from the ground up, so to speak, starting with 
the physical phenomenon of irritations and eventually proceed-
ing to the cognitions which these irritations constitute. Herder 
identifies irritations as contractions and expansions of bodily fi-
bers, which he asserts as conditions for mental phenomena: 
“perhaps without this sowing of obscure stirrings and irritations 
our most divine forces [i.e.: those of the mind] would not exist.”vi 
He grounds this claim in the correlation of behaviors with the 
stimulation of these fibers: “The courage of the lion, like the fear-
fulness of the hare, lies ensouled in its inner structure…. The 
heart of Achilles was shaken in its plexus by black anger, it re-
quired irritability to become an Achilles.”vii Strictly speaking, the 
final sentence asserts irritations as only a necessary condition 
(‘required’) for cognitions, but soon after Herder articulates the 
stronger claim that irritations are also sufficient conditions: “In 
my modest opinion, no psychology is possible which is not in each 
step determinate physiology.”viii Mental phenomena are thus de-
termined by physical phenomena of irritations.ix 
 The link with Herder’s empiricist position becomes clear 
20 
once we note that sensations are realized by irritations, or, more 
precisely, that the term ‘sensation’ picks out a subset of irrita-
tions, namely those that stand in a causal relation to an external 
object via the senses: “All coarse senses, fibers, and irritations can 
only sense in themselves; the object must come in addition, touch 
them, and in a certain sense itself become one with them. Here a 
way is already opened for cognition outside us.”x Thus, Herder’s 
empiricist picture emerges (unsurprisingly) as a naturalist one: 
mental states are determined by physical irritations, either, in the 
case of subjective states like emotions, by ‘irritations in them-
selves’ (i.e.: not causally related to a sense), or, in the case of ob-
jective cognitions (those whose content is about the external 
world), by irritations that stand in a causal relation to a sensory 
organ (sensations), which is in turn causally related to an exter-
nal object.  
 It is important to note (as this will serve as a crucial premise 
later on), that while Herder commits himself to a naturalistic sto-
ry about our mental states, he does not go so far as to reduce 
them to sensations, insofar as a reduction would imply elimina-
tion. One may find such a move appealing—given that we can 
show mental phenomena to be realized by physical phenomena 
(in this context, irritations), it is not a great leap further to claim 
that mental phenomena are identical to their physical realizers, 
and nothing ‘over and above’ them. But it is clear that Herder 
wants to avoid such a notion of cognitions: “the head has the 
power to bring sensations which flow through the body into a 
single representation, and to guide the former through the latter, 
which seems to be of such a different nature.”xi Here, when 
Herder refers to a ‘single representation,’ he seems to mean a 
cognition, which, in virtue of its apparently ‘different nature,’ 
should be considered distinct from its sensations, even if it is ulti-
mately determined by these sensations. One way to motivate this 
is to note that if we take the singular nature of a cognition to be a 
genuine property, it is hard to see how we could explain this 
property if the cognition were merely a plurality of sensations. 
Thus, though our cognitions are determined by our physically 
grounded sensations, the term ‘cognition’ still picks out some-
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thing beyond physical sensation—namely, the instantiation of a 
concept by a particular cognition.  
 
II. The ‘Quasi’ Arm 
 Most empiricists would be more or less satisfied by the above 
picture by itself. But Herder complicates his picture by asserting 
that the interaction between sensations and cognitions is bidirec-
tional; not only do sensations determine cognitions, but sensa-
tions depend on, in some sense, concepts, instantiated by cogni-
tions. Before attempting to reconstruct this arm of Herder’s pic-
ture, it is important to clarify what this thesis cannot be asserting. 
One may initially contemplate the picture as one of simple 
‘feedback,’ where sensations constitute a cognition, and that this 
cognition itself then influences the sensations which have deter-
mined it. This clearly cannot be Herder’s position, because it 
would violate his empiricist thesis; if the very cognition consti-
tuted by the sensations influences those same determining sensa-
tions, then either we are not dealing with the same cognition, be-
cause its determining sensations have been modified, or the cog-
nition is not strictly determined by its sensations, because we are 
dealing with the same cognition across changes in the corre-
sponding sensations, which are supposed to determine it. What-
ever  the  ‘quasi’  aspect  of  Herder’s  thesis  amounts  to,  the 
‘influence’ cognition in general has on sensations must come into 
play before the particular cognition those sensations determine 
does—otherwise, we lose the empiricist aspect of the picture. 
 First, assuming that a pure empiricistxii position is intuitively 
appealing in its own right, we must motivate Herder’s decision 
to complicate the picture. It seems that we can do so by noting 
two examples of radical conceptual difference that Herder de-
scribes which a purely empiricist picture would have trouble ex-
plaining. The first describes a Western Christian missionary who 
“smells of animal blood,” and is hindered in his communication 
with a Brahmin in virtue of this.xiii While the example in the text 
is admittedly somewhat obscure, the thrust of it seems to be that 
the missionary fails to communicate with the Brahmin (i.e.: to 
yield the desired cognitions in the Brahmin) where, if an individ-
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ual of the missionary’s own culture was placed in the position of 
the Brahmin and supplied with all of the same sensations (the 
missionary’s spoken utterances and the smell of animal blood) 
the desired cognitions would be yielded.xiv 
 The second example notes that individuals of different na-
tionalities tend to “understand something so different” in the 
context of, for example, viewing a painting, to the point that “If 
one could pursue this difference in the contributions of different 
senses through lands, times, and peoples, the matter would inev-
itably become an infinity.”xv This ‘infinity’ of difference seems to 
imply (at least) the possibility of radically different cognitions 
yielded by identical external world phenomena that should, on a 
‘pure empiricist’ picture, give rise to the same sensations (such as 
the same perception of a painting), and thus the same cognitions.  
 This second example, however, points to a second problem as 
well, which Herder does not explicitly recognize—one of concep-
tual convergence. That is, while one may be perplexed by the 
radical differences in cognitions between members of distinction 
nationalities, one may equally be perplexed by the similarity of 
cognitions between members of the same nationality.xvi If it is 
possible at all for cognitions yielded from (nearly) identical sen-
sations (strictly, from the external physical phenomena which 
give rise to those sensations) to diverge, why is it the case that 
they converge so clearly for members of the same nationality, so 
that Herder could divide up his example into the ‘Frenchmen, 
Italians and Dutchmen’ in the first place? 
 Herder seems to note two sorts of explanation available to 
the pure empiricist: 1. Differences (or similarity) in individual 
constitution; 2. Differences (or similarity) in ‘circles of sensa-
tions.’ According to (1), as Herder observes: “The deepest basis 
of  our  existence  is  individual,  both  in  sensations  and  in 
thoughts” and that “[s]ons of a single tribal father who share a 
more identical [physiological] organization… inevitably think 
more similarly to each other.”xvii A pure empiricist might argue 
that we can explain the failure of communication in the first in-
stance and the differences in the understanding of the painting in 
the second in terms of physiology—if the sensory organs of the 
Cognition and Sensation 23 
Philip Yaure 
missionary and Brahmin are sufficiently different, then surely 
their cognitions will not be identical, because their sensations are 
not. But this sort of explanation does not seem to suffice for the 
systematic nature of Herder’s examples: it is not that Herder is 
caught up in the case of any one missionary and Brahmin failing 
to communicate, but rather that almost any missionary and Brah-
min would have this conceptual divergence in the supposed sce-
nario. Likewise, it seems implausible to claim that there is suffi-
cient systematic physiological difference between Frenchmen 
and Italians to explain their different understandings of the 
painting. A parallel point can be made for the phenomenon of 
conceptual convergence: it is implausible that we could divide 
up a group of individuals in a room according to nationality 
simply by examining the functional nature of their sensory or-
gans! 
 According to (2), a pure empiricist might argue that the dif-
ference is a consequence different “circles of sensations” for 
members of different nationalities.xviii That is, the missionary and 
Brahmin, or Frenchman and Italian, live in geographical regions 
with radically different sensory experiences,  and so will  of 
course have radically different conceptual frameworks, because 
concepts (instantiated by cognitions) rise up out of sensation. But 
it is unclear how such an example can come to bear on the pre-
sent cases, because, in the examples being considered, the sensa-
tions (or, more precisely, the external world phenomena which 
give rise the sensations) are being held constant, so the sort of 
conceptual difference we are dealing with here is not simply a 
consequence  of  inhabiting  different  geographic  or  temporal 
realms. A pure empiricist may contend that, in the Brahmin ex-
ample, the sensation of animal blood yields a volitional effect 
that then influences his cognition (say, that he desires not to be 
near particular sorts of slain animals, and this desire interferes 
with his cognitive process of understanding the missionary’s 
speech). Initially, it might seem that such a position is damaging 
to Herder, as he sees an intimate relation between our volitions 
and cognitions, “Would the head think if your heart did not 
beat?”, so that there is room for our volitions to influence our 
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cognitions. But it is unclear how the pure empiricist could push 
this line without discarding his own thesis about the determina-
tion of cognitions by sensations. For if two (nearly) identical sets 
of sensations could yield two radically different cognitions, then 
it does not seem that the cognition is determined by its sensa-
tions. To say that the difference is a consequence of the influence 
of volitions (or other cognitions, Herder takes them to be two 
sides of the same coin, see Cognitions, 215) without allowing this 
to play out on the level of sensations is to deny the empiricist, 
and moreover, possibly the naturalistic thesis (since the physical 
story behind such influence is unclear if one denies that this in-
fluence is realized on the level of physically grounded sensa-
tions), which is to discard precisely what is presupposed by both 
Herder and the pure empiricist. That is, if we take a naturalistic 
and empiricist position as our starting point, it is hard to see how 
complicating the ‘higher-level’ picture can avoid complicating 
our talk on the level of sensations and irritations.  
 Likewise, in the case of conceptual convergence, it seems that 
individuals classified under a given nationality, who share a 
great many concepts, do not have the corresponding shared 
‘circle of sensations’ that the pure empiricist would posit (think 
of a factory worker in Paris and a fisherman on the coast of the 
Mediterranean). To explain conceptual divergence in the case of 
presumed convergence of sensation, and conceptual convergence 
in the case of presumed divergence of sensation, our sensations, 
which, on an empiricist thesis determine our cognitions, must be 
determined by something beyond the external world (or physio-
logical organization of sensory organs) in which they stand in a 
relation to, as such explanations fail to suffice for the examples in 
question. And the obvious entities to do this explanatory work 
are the differing conceptual frameworks themselves.  
 If sensations depend on, in some sense, concepts (instantiated 
by cognitions), we can effectively explain the above examples. 
The Brahmin’s sensation corresponding to the animal blood de-
pends upon his concept of its type, which is distinct from that of 
the missionary. In virtue of this, the Brahmin and missionary 
have distinct sensations and so, in light of the empiricist thesis 
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(that cognitions are determined by their sensations), distinct cog-
nitions. Likewise, Frenchmen and Italians plausibly have differ-
ent conceptual frameworks, in virtue of their distinct languages 
(more on this relation below), and so conceptual influence on 
their perception of the painting can explain their distinct cogni-
tions of it. And in the case of conceptual convergence, the shared 
conceptual framework (once again, in light of the shared lan-
guage) of members of a nationality would help to unify their 
cognitions, if we posit that the particular sensations an individu-
al has depend on the conceptual framework that individual in-
habits. 
 The crucial question, then, is how sensations depend on con-
cepts. It seems that Herder could mean one of two things here: 
either simply that the irritations which yield cognitions of con-
cepts in some way influence our sensations, or that concepts, by 
means of cognitions, interact with sensations in a sense over and 
above their instantiating irritations. I will argue that the first 
reading is implausible in light of Herder’s non-eliminative natu-
ralism, and so attempt to reconstruct a possible line the latter 
reading could take. Before we begin, however, it is important to 
discard a third possibility that seems to present itself initially: 
that the concept, independent of the cognitions which instantiate 
it, could influence our sensations in some way. Such a possibility 
seems to be a non-starter for Herder, as it seems that to talk of 
concepts independent from cognitions would require us to posit 
an ‘ideal’ or ‘Platonic’ realm for concepts, for it is unclear how 
else we could talk about concepts in a physically-grounded 
sense. But it is precisely such a move that Herder rejects in his 
philosophy of language.xix, xx Moreover, even if we were to per-
mit such talk of ‘Platonic’ concepts, it is exceptionally obscure 
how such concepts could stand in any naturalistic relation to 
physical phenomena, as the two radically differ in type. And, 
according to Beiser, it is precisely these sorts of concerns which 
Herder’s naturalism is seeking to avoid: “if we are dualists… 
then we cannot account for the fact that [physical and mental or 
conceptual phenomena] interact.”xxi 
 On the ‘irritations only’ reading, our story would seem to go 
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as such: my concept of green, for example, is instantiated in a 
cognition which is yielded by a set of irritations. These irritations 
exert causal influence on my perception of an object, such that 
my sensations of that object are formulated in such a way as to 
yield a particular cognition of the object as green. Such a picture 
seems implausible for two reasons. First, by itself, it does not 
seem terribly ‘quasi-empiricist:’ at the core, we simply have a one 
physical phenomenon exerting causal influence on another phys-
ical phenomenon. The concept of green itself seems to be doing 
no explanatory work—the sensation being influenced only de-
pends on the concept insofar as the irritations doing the causal 
influence happen to correspond to a cognition of that concept. 
But the story, by itself, in no way guarantees that the irritations 
doing the causal work do in fact correspond to such a cognition. 
Second, to extend this concern, it seems that we are pushed to-
wards an elimintivist notion of cognitions—if all that is doing 
work in the story are the irritations, it seems that we have no 
room for talk of cognitions beyond their use as shorthand for a 
certain set of irritations. But it is clear that Herder rejects such a 
notion of cognitions (see final paragraph of section I). Thus, it 
seems that Herder’s sensations depend on concepts (and their 
instantiating cognitions) cannot be satisfactory fleshed out solely 
in terms of irritations.  
 Thus, it seems that we must understand something more ro-
bust by the idea that our sensations depend on our cognitions.  
This is not to say that we reject the above picture of irritations 
outright, for to do so would imply an interaction between cogni-
tions and physical sensations that is not ultimately grounded 
physically, and so force us into a dualistic distinction which 
Herder rejects.xxii Rather, the point is that such a story by itself is, 
though necessary, insufficient to explain the influence of con-
cepts on sensations, and so we must introduce more on the level 
of cognitions and the mind itself into the picture. 
 I take there to be two aspects essential to Herder’s explana-
tion: the characterization of mental faculties as ‘forces’ and the 
‘translation’ of sensations to ‘images’ by the mind. Herder’s use 
of ‘force’ refers to the active aspect of the mind, in contrast to its 
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receptive, passive aspect: “Every higher degree of power, of atten-
tion and abstraction, of voluntary choice and freedom, lies in this ob-
scure foundation of the most intimate irritation and consciousness 
[that the soul has] of itself, of its force, of its inner life.”xxiii In order 
to maintain the ‘sui generis’ (to use Beiser’s term) character of the 
mind, Herder uses ‘force’ to pick out the way in which a mind 
(by means of its ‘ensouled’ body) can actively influence its world, 
in a way that a non-ensouled body could not. The purely empiri-
cist aspect of Herder’s story fails to do justice to this aspect of the 
mind, as the story is purely receptive: the mind receives sensa-
tions that determine its cognitions. Moreover, while Herder ob-
serves that many are tempted to decompose the mind into a vari-
ety of forces, each corresponding to a particular mental faculty 
(e.g. imagination, memory), he emphasizes that the mind is a 
unified entity: “all these forces are at bottom only a single force, 
if they are to be human, good, and useful…. the same energy of 
the soul.”xxiv That is, Herder sees an intimate link between the 
active and unified characteristics of the mind. 
 Admittedly, beyond the active and unified nature of the 
mind, Herder has little to say in On the Cognitions or On Images, 
about what ‘force’ actually amounts to. Beiser seems to infer 
from Herder’s concept of force a ‘vitalist’ picture, describing 
them as “organic powers,” claiming that Herder “maintains that 
we know the effects of a power from experience, and that we are 
therefore justified in assuming some organic powers as the caus-
es of those effects.”xxv But because Herder is obscure on the na-
ture of these ‘organic powers,’ the question is left open as to 
whether ‘force’ actually refers to any empirical phenomena, and, 
moreover, the obscurity of the concept hinders its explanatory 
value for a theory of the mind. 
 It seems, however, that we can take Herder’s concept of 
force, instead of picking out material aspect of the mind, rather 
formal conditions for any satisfactory material explanation of the 
mind. That is, to posit that the mind is essentially a unified force 
is to specify criteria for whatever empirical answer we are meant 
to supply—the concept itself need not be taken to do any materi-
al explanatory work here. In fact, we see a similar move being 
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made even in the case of irritations, which seem to have clear 
empirical grounding for Herder: “I could give ten formulas for a 
solution in empty and uncertain expressions…. But what would 
all that mean? Basically, still just that it irritates when it irritates, 
and that everyone believes.”xxvi Even in the case of irritations, 
Herder seems unconcerned with the particular empirical expla-
nation (‘expression’) that is put forth (at least for his purposes in 
sketching out a theory of the mind), and so it would seem rea-
sonable to take this to be his general position, including on the 
concept of force. Herder’s obscurity about the particular mechan-
ics of irritations and forces is not the consequence of a thin mate-
rial explanation, but rather the necessary consequence of an at-
tempt to set out the formal conditions of what it is to be a mind. 
In the case of irritations, the mind must be determined by some 
physical phenomena (for which the term ‘irritations’ stands in), 
and must nevertheless be considered an active, unified entity 
(which the term ‘force’ specifies). And as Beiser himself notes, we 
posit these criteria in the first place because they describe our 
experience of minds. Whatever material explanation is to be giv-
en, Herder is setting out the formal criteria it must satisfy.xxvii 
 The second aspect of Herder’s explanation of the dependence 
of sensations on cognitions is that of ‘translation.’ In On the Cog-
nitions, Herder describes language as the “medium of our self-
feeling and mental consciousness”, which seems to describe the 
relation of  our irritations  and (‘self-feeling’)  and cognitions 
(‘mental consciousness’).xxviii The point is clearer in On Images: 
“When the soul sees objects as images, or rather when it trans-
forms them into mental images, according to what rules that are 
imprinted on it, what is it doing but translating.”xxix That is, in 
order for one to form a cognition of an object in perception (an 
‘image’), a process of translation is required, which is carried out 
through the vehicle of language. Moreover, this process of trans-
lation is taken as necessary to satisfy the formal criterion of the 
unity of the mind:  
The object has so little in common with the image, 
the image with the thought, the thought with the 
expression,  the  visual  perception  with  the 
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name…. Only the communicability among our sev-
eral  senses and the harmony prevailing between 
them, whereupon this communication rests—only 
this constitutes the inner form of the so-called per-
fectibility of man.xxx 
Because of the disparate nature of cognitions, sensations, and 
objects, we need a medium, language, to unify them. But 
Herder takes the need to posit this medium to follow from the 
‘harmony,’ or unity, of the mind, which we take as one of the 
formal criteria which any theory of the mind must satisfy. The 
final step is to note that, in Herder’s philosophy of language, 
language and concepts are intimately bound up, so that it is in 
the very translation of our sensations that concepts come to 
bear on sensations.xxxi That is, in order to think of an object of 
perception (supplied to us by sensations), we must do so lin-
guistically, which requires a translation of the sensations into 
an ‘image,’ and in this act of translation we find the applica-
tion of concepts to sensations, and thus the ‘quasi’ aspect of 
Herder’s  quasi-empiricism.  The  formal  criteria  of  ‘force’ 
square neatly here, as it is the unified nature of the mind that 
leads us to posit a medium that can ensure this unity, while 
the active natures enables the act of translation, and thus the 
application of concepts to sensations, to be the way in which 
language, as the medium, establishes this unity.  
 We may thus return to the question of how this notion of 
‘dependence’ of sensations on cognitions/concepts is to be 
understood. One may initially be tempted to characterize the 
relation as causal—the act of translation exerts a causal influ-
ence on the sensations provided to a subject, yielding a dis-
tinct sensation. But it is unclear that we should take Herder’s 
picture to be describing the distinct temporal moments that a 
causal relation would imply—for, as observed above, Herder 
seems to be establishing the formal framework for an empiri-
cal theory of the mind, rather than the empirical theory itself. 
That is, we need not take Herder’s claim to be that we have 
sensations at one moment, and then at the next, after this pro-
cess of translation occurs, we find ourselves with a cognition. 
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Rather, if we instead understand the act of translation as one 
of presentation of sensations to the mind in a comprehensible 
mode, so that the ‘different natures’ of sensations and cogni-
tions are able to stand in a relation to each other, the notion of 
the ‘dependency’ of sensations on cognitions can be seen as a 
consequence of what Herder takes to be the formal criteria for 
something to be a mind. That is, the mind is a unified entity, 
and this unity requires some medium to connect what seem to 
be disparate aspects of it, such as its cognitions and sensa-
tions, and Herder takes the medium that does this work to be 
language, for thought is essentially linguistic in nature. But in 
positing language as the medium by which the mind is uni-
fied, we see that sensations must depend upon cognitions, 
which in turn must be presented in a linguistic mode. That is, 
to employ a language in translation is necessarily to employ a 
conceptual framework (instantiated by cognitions), and so if 
the integration of sensations with cognitions requires the for-
mer, it must also require the latter. We thus come to see the 
notion of dependence here not as causal, but as a logical pre-
supposition of Herder’s unified concept of the mind. We can 
take Herder’s ‘quasi-empiricist’ thesis, then, not as a nebulous 
attempt at material explanation of the mechanics of the mind, 
but rather as the specification of the form that any such mate-
rial explanation must take.  
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Notes 
i. Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) studied under 
Kant at the University of Konigsberg, producing in his 
career a variety of texts in disciplines we would now rec-
ognize as philosophy of language, mind, and history, as 
well as political philosophy. Michael Forster observes 
that “Herder can claim to have established whole disci-
plines which we now take for granted” (Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, 2007), such as modern philoso-
phy of language, which assumes the intimate relation 
between thought and language Herder posited, as well as 
modern hermeneutics and linguistics. In his historical 
context, we can also see his philosophy as something of a 
reaction to the idealism centered on the thought of his 
professor at Konigsberg. Some aspects of this reaction 
can be seen in the reconstruction attempted here, though 
I will not draw out these connections explicitly. 
ii. Part of my hope is that this paper will encourage a fresh 
examination of Herder’s philosophy of mind (and his 
philosophy generally) in the Anglophone community, as 
it bears significant relations to modern analytic philoso-
phy in its emphasis on the relation of thought and lan-
guage and the role of philosophy in the science of the 
mind. Because of limitations of scope and length, I cannot 
address the contemporary relevance of Herder at length 
here. I do, however, hope to initiate such a conversation 
with this paper. 
iii. Johann Gottfried von Herder, “On the Cognition and 
Sensation of the Human Soul,” in Philosophical Writings, 
ed. Michael Forster, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 209. 
iv. Johann Gottfried von Herder, “On Images, Poetry, and 
Fables,” in Aesthetics, trans. Gregory Moore (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 360. 
v. It is important to note, as will be emphasized below, that 
constitution here does not entail eliminative reduction. 
That is, the purported fact that a mental phenomenon is 
made up of physical phenomena (‘irritations’) does not 
entail that the mental phenomenon is nothing over and 
above, or distinct from, those physical phenomena, on 
Herder’s view. Or another way of putting this, physical 
phenomena may instantiate tokens of a mental type, but 
this does not entail that the type itself is merely physical. 
To avoid the implication of such reduction, I will hereaf-
ter use the weaker term ‘determination,’ but this should 
be taken to refer to a non-eliminative constitutive relation 
between the mental and physical. 
vi. Herder, “Cognitions,” 189 
vii. ibid, 195 
viii. ibid, 196, emphasis his. 
ix. An interesting concern, a detailed discussion of which is 
unfortunately beyond our scope, questions whether 
Herder’s commitment to the determination of mental 
phenomena by the (strictly speaking) biological phenom-
ena of irritations actually commits him to a genuinely nat-
uralist picture. Specifically, if one reads Herder in a vital-
ist light (see, for example, Beiser’s approach below), one 
may see room for holding this determinate relation and 
denying that the biological, and thus the mental, are de-
termined by the physical. Naturalism would thus seem to 
be an inappropriate characterization. If such a position, 
however, justifies its vitalist reading by emphasizing 
Herder’s reference to the ‘forces’ [Krafte] of the soul, it 
would seem to be in troubled waters, as will be argued 
below. 
x. Herder, “Cognitions,” 203, emphasis his. 
xi. Herder, “Cognitions,” 194, emphasis his. 
xii. To be clear, by a ‘pure empiricist’ position, I mean a posi-
tion on which our sensations determine our cognitions, 
full stop—no ‘feedback’ or conceptual dependence for 
those sensations. 
xiii. Herder, “Cognitions,” 220 
xiv. Of course, in order to make the example interesting, we 
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must assume that Brahmin is typically able to understand 
language used by the missionary. 
xv. Herder, “Cognitions,” 204 
xvi.  ‘Nationality’ here is meant to refer to a group of 
individuals who share a language, culture, history, etc. 
This sense of nationality need not correspond directly to 
the nation-states of Herder’s time or ours (though Herder 
does refer to such states in the passage referenced). 
xvii. Herder, “Cognitions,” 217, 219-220 
xviii. ibid, 220 
xix. Michael Forester, introduction to Philosophical Writings, 
xv 
xx. This may lead one to ask how I can talk about any con-
cept at all, independent from a particular instantiation of 
it as a cognition. One way to resolve this concern is to as-
sert that when I talk about my concept of green, I need 
not refer to any historic instance of my thought about 
green, but that I do need to refer to a possible cognition of 
the concept. 
xxi.  Frederick C. Besier, “Herder’s Philosophy of Mind” in 
The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to 
Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 146 
xxii.  Herder, “Cognitions,” 208 
xxiii.  ibid, 209, emphasis his 
xxiv.  ibid, 211 
xxv.  Beiser, “Herder’s Philosophy of Mind,” 148 
xxvi.  Herder, “Cognitions,” 200 
xxvii  Perhaps this is what philosophy of mind ought to be dis-
posed towards generally—to establish the formal frame-
work in which any empirical science of the mind must 
operate within. A heavy reliance on a particular fine-
grained scientific theory in a philosophical theory of the 
mind would thus get things backwards: our scientific the-
ory should be held accountable to satisfying certain philo-
sophical requires in order to be a sufficient theory of 
mind. Though, to be sure, the actual (as well as probably 
optimal) strategy sees the two approaches in a productive 
dynamic. The key is that philosophy of mind ought to 
formalize its theories in such a way that a non-trivial 
change in the science of the mind doesn’t bring the whole 
philosophical edifice crashing to the ground. As we can 
see with Herder: there is a sense in which his philosophy 
of mind transcends the scientific moment he engages 
with. Though the latter may be confined to the dust bins 
of history, there is still life in Herder. 
xxviii. Herder, “Cognitions,” 211 
xxix.  Herder, “Images,” 359 
xxx.  ibid 359, emphasis his. 
xxxi.  See, for example, “Fragments on Recent German Litera-
ture,” in Philosophical Writings, 48-49.  
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